Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 59

Issue 2

Article 4

1970

Injunctions Against Speech and Writing: A Re-Evaluation
William O. Bertelsman
University of Cincinnati

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the First Amendment Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Bertelsman, William O. (1970) "Injunctions Against Speech and Writing: A Re-Evaluation," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 59: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol59/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Injunctions Against Speech and
Writing: A Re-Evaluation
By W irmlA_
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Positing that the public interest rule in defamation cases
erected by New York Times v. Sullivan is applicable to injunctive
as well as damages actions, and saying that the trade libel cases
are long standing precedent that the doctrine against prior
restraint is not applicable to all defamatory expression, Mr.
Bertelsman develops an approach for allowing injunctions in
what he denominates as the defamation-privacyareas.
Good name in man and woman....
Is the immediate jewel of their souls
Who steals my purse steals trash; . ..
But he that ifiches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
-Othello, Act III, Sc. 3.
I. INTRODUCTION

A chief characteristic of equity has always been that a plaintiff
might invoke its assistance ff his remedy at law was inadequate.
In other words, subject to certain exceptions and defenses, if the
injury done him is of such a nature that it is not fully compensable
by money damages, he is affirmatively entitled to specific relief
in the form of a judicial command to the defendant to refrain
from the objectionable conduct.
For instance, to cite some of the classic situations, the aid of
equity has been traditionally invoked to enforce specifically
* A.B., Xavied University, 1958; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1961; Member
of Kentucky and Ohio Bar; Lecturer on Law, University of Cincinnati College of
Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance afforded him in

the preparation of this article by Mr. Kenneth Matticks under the University of
Cincinnati College of Law research assistance program.
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contracts for the sale of land,' or for a unique chatte 2 such as an
heirloom; or to prevent the commission of a tortious injury where
damages are inadequate to make the plaintiff whole, such as in
cases of waste, 3 continuing trespass, 4 or nuisance.5 It is common
for equity to be invoked even in situations where special circumstances, such as the insolvency of the defendant,6 render a
judgment for damages nugatory.
In other words, the hallmark of equity is to afford complete
justice insofar as human limitations permit. This has been its
distinguishing characteristic since its origin, which probably
occurred when some peasant appealed to the king against the
injustice of his feudal overlord who was too powerful to be
amenable to the local courts7
Yet, there is one area where equity has failed to fulfill this
proud tradition of rendering complete justice. This is in dealing
with injuries caused by speech and writing. If an enemy of
yours is falsely circulating around your neighborhood that you
are a Communist or a sexual pervert, or your creditor displays
on the public street a large sign that you do not pay your bills,
you are sustaining a continuing injury to your reputation and your
standing among your fellow men, and thus to your very personality and fundamental human dignity,' which no award of
damages can adequately repair.
One familiar with equity's tradition of accomplishing complete justice wherever possible might well think that he would
1 W. DEFuvi.K, HAmDBOOK OF MODERN EQuITY § 70 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as DEFuNIAx]; H. McCLIrocj, EQurr §§ 150-52 (1948) [hereinafter cited as McCLiNTOCK].

2 DEFuN ax § 71; McCrxnrocX §§ 152-58.
3 DEFuNIAK §§ 26-28; McCLnrocK §§ 132, 141.
4 DEFuNIAx §§ 29-31; McCr.NTocx § 133.
5 DEFuNiAx §§ 22, 27; McCiN'r ocx § 47.
6 DEFuNL.&x §§ 22, 67; McCrnaNrocK § 47.
7 F. MArrLAND, EQUITY AND THE FoRms OF ACTION AT CGO
~nrON LAw 4, 5
(1920); Glenn & Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers,31 VA. L. REv.
753 (1945).
8 For the purposes of this article, the premise will be accepted that the
significant social interest protected by the law of defamation and privacy is the
psychic integrity, personality, or inherent human dignity of the individual. See
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (concurring opinion); Berney, Libel
and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1,
40-41 (1965); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity; An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1000-03 (1964); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 922 (1963); Spiegel, Public
Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 S. CAr. L.
Rizv. 280, 288 (1957).
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be able to obtain an injunction against such conduct. But in all
probability he would be wrong. For a number of reasons, equity
has traditionally refused to grant an injunction against speech
or writing,9 no matter how clear the proof of falsehood, and no
matter how inadequate an award of pecuniary damages is to repair the harm done to the victim.
This article proposes to discuss the reasons for this failure, as
this writer considers it, of equity to protect human personality
in an area that seems most appropriate for the use of equitable
remedies, and to attempt a general re-evaluation of the problem
of granting injunctive relief in the defamation-privacy area in
view of the teaching of the New York Times line of cases. This
involves, first, an examination of the traditional view that equity
should deny injunctive relief to protect personality in the defamation-privacy area. Second is an effort to show that the doctrine
of prior restraint, which has historically been the cornerstone of
that traditional view, has been greatly exaggerated as an obstacle
to the granting of such relief. Third, the first amendment theory
embodied in the New York Times Co. line of cases will be adduced
as the foundation for an approach which constitutes the main
thrust of this article. Fourth, some practical applications of the
approach suggested by the article will be discussed.
It is the position of this article that the above re-evaluation
will support the granting of injunctions against defamation or
the invasion of privacy under the following approach:
1. To obtain such an injunction the plaintiff should be required to show irreparable injury if the injunction is not
granted, not in a merely formal sense, as is true in some
contexts in equity,10 but in a strict sense such as the destruction of his character, good name, or his ability to pursue his livelihood or to live his life in peace and quiet, or
the infliction of severe emotional distress;
2. Where falsity is an issue, the plaintiff must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the expression sought to be
restrained is false;
9 It was recently stated: "To enjoin any publication, no matter how libelous,
would be repugnant to the First Amendment to the Constitution ... and to historic principles of equity." Konigsberg v. Time, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
IoE.g., the granting of specific performance of a contract for the sale of land
to a vendor, just because the action involves land. DEFuNmx § 70.
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3. The injunction must be narrowly drawn and the matter to
be enjoined particularly described so that publication of
only the objectionable matter will be inhibited;
4. No injunction should be granted where the defamation
amounts to a libel of a government official or a candidate
for public office, or the subject matter is so imbued with
the public interest that it outweighs the social policy in the
protection of reputation and privacy.
II. THE

TADmONAL VIEW DENING INJUNCTIVE RELEF

AGAINST SPEECH OR WRITNG
A personal enemy, judicially found to be motivated by spite,
is circulating false documents and making oral accusations that
an attorney engaged in private practice is "a crook" and "a slimy
kike."' Or, perhaps a crank is going around the neighborhood
falsely accusing a private citizen of seducing a fifteen-year old
girl and displaying a forged letter purporting to be signed by the
accused citizen in support of the false accusations.1"
If the attorney or the defamed citizen seeks an injunction to
restrain repetition of the defamation, even if he is able to allege
and prove that there is irreparable injury to his reputation and
private and professional relations of such nature that damages
are not an adequate remedy, relief would very probably be denied
under existing precedents. Under the traditional view expressed
in these precedents, both the attorney and the victim of the
malicious crank must be denied the injunction they seek and
left to their remedy in damages for whatever it may be worth.
And it is likely to be worth very little. In one case, although the
plaintiff had recovered damages, the malice of the defendant was
apparently sufficient to motivate her to pursue her program of
character assassination indefinitely. 3 In another, the defendant
11 Greenberg v. Burglass, 254 La. 1019, 229 So. 2d 83 (1969). See also
Kuass v. Kersey, 139 W. Va. 497, 81 S.E.2d 237 (1954), where a dissatisfied
client falsely accused an attorney of being "dishonest, unscrupulous, unethical, a
'shyster,
a deceiver, and betrayer of clients." Id. at -, 81 S.E.2d at 239.
12
Kivett v. Nichols, 190 Tenn. 12, 227 S.W.2d 39 (9509).
'34 Greenberg v. Burglass, 254 La. 1019, 229 So. 2dW83(16)
1 Kuass v. Kersey, 139 W. Va. 497, 81 S.E.2d 237 (1954).
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was insolvent.' 4 Nevertheless, injunctive relief was denied in
both cases, as it has been in many other cases, 15 because of the
rule against enjoining speech or writing.
The principal reasons invoked in support of this traditional

view, denying injunctive relief in such cases, are these: (1) to
grant the injunction would constitute a prior restraint on speech
and, therefore, be unconstitutional; (2) equity will protect only
property rights, not personal rights; and (3) granting an injunction would deny the defendant his right to trial by jury on the
issue of truth.16
The soundness of these reasons has been continually attacked
by scholars for more than half a century.' 7 The prohibition

against equity's enforcing personal rights has so long been denounced by forward-looking courts and commentators that it may
safely be said that that limitation has been discarded."8 It has
been demonstrated that the jury trial problem can be overcome
by granting relief only in cases "where it is admitted that the
publication is false, or the falsity is so clear that there is really
nothing for a jury to try." 9 Also, the court could, in appropriate

cases, use an advisory jury.
There remains, then, only the constitutional problem of prior

restraint, which historically has proved to be the most formidable
obstacle to the granting of injunctive relief in cases involving

speech or writing. If the thesis suggested in this article is to be
successfully defended, that obstacle must be overcome.
15 See Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1967); Crosby v. Bradstreet
Co., 312 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1963); Robert E. Hicks Corp. v. National Salesmen's
Training Corp., 19 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1927); Murphy v. Daytona Beach Humane
Soc'y, 176 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1965); McFadden v. Detroit Bar Ass'n, 4 Mich. App.
554, 145 N.W.2d 285 (1966); Kyritsis v. Vieron, 363 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1964).
See also Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 715 (1956).
16Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality,
29 HAnv. L. ryEv. 640 (1916).
17 See generally Pound, supra note 16; Sedler, Injunctive Relief and Personal
Integrity, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 147 (1964); Note, Developments in the Law:
Injunctions, 78 HARy. L. 1Ev. 994, 1011-12 (1965).
'8E.g., Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957); Mark v. Kahn,
333 Mass. 517 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956); Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass.
528, 70 N.E.2A 241 (1946); Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933
(1899). See DEFuNiAx § 56; Sedler, supra note 17 at 149-50.
19 Pound, supra note 16 at 657; Sedler, supra note 17 at 154. It has recently
been suggested that the first amendment requires the contraction, rather than the
expansion of the jury's functions in free speech cases. See Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process", 83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 526-32 (1970).
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III. PIOR RESMAINT AS A BAR TO THE PROTECTION OF
REPUTATION AND PRIVACY BY INJUNCION

A. The History of the PriorRestraint Doctrine
According to the most comprehensive treatment of the doctrine of prior restraint published to date, the doctrine arose upon
the demise of the laws requiring licensing of printing presses in
18th century England. 20 The chief reason for the lapse of these
laws appears to be that they were unwieldy and difficult to
administer, but nevertheless, "[i]n the course of the eighteenth
century, freedom of the press from licensing came to assume the
status of a common law or natural right."2 '
The status of this right was brought to the colonies and into
American legal lore through Blackstone, 2 who wrote in a work
that had tremendous influence on the development of American
law:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press;
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he
2
must take the consequences of his own temerity.3
Those who have discussed this statement have done so mainly
to express the view that freedom of the press ought to consist of
more than mere freedom from prior restraint. 4 At least in the
area with which we are concerned here, the protection of personal rights from abridgement by speech or writing, the converse
of Blackstone's proposition, i.e., that any prior restraint is an
abridgement of freedom of speech or the press, has been accepted
without much critical analysis.
Such an analysis should begin by pointing out that, as far as
20
Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. POn.
648, 650-51 (1955).
21 Id. at 651.

22 Id.; I. BRANT, THEE Bn.L OF RiGHTs, ITS ORGIN AND MEaNN

93-94 (1965).
BLACKSTONE, COiVMENTARS §§ 151-52.
24 1. BRNr, ThE BrLL OF RIGRTs, ITS OioiN Am MEANIr 95-96 n. 83
23

(1965).
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injunctions against speech and writing are concerned, the prior
restraint doctrine has not even been consistently applied. For
there are certain lines of cases, existing side by side with those
refusing injunctive relief in the defamation-privacy area, where
injunctions against speech and writing have come to be freely
granted. These cases, no less than those involving defamation
and privacy, constitute prior restraints on expression. Thus, they
demonstrate that the sweeping statements noted above,25 that
equity will never enjoin expression, must be taken with a very
large grain of salt indeed.
B. Anomalous Exceptions to the Prior Restraint Doctrine
1. The Trade Libel Cases
If the plaintiff is concerned not so much with the libel of
himself personally, but with damage done to his business by the
publication of untrue assertions, the courts will grant injunctive
relief much more readily. In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company, an owner of real estate located near an aluminum plant
posted a large billboard prominently next to the highway stating
that fumes from the plant killed his cattle and endangered human
health. Declining to follow the recommendations of a special
master, the court granted an injunction requiring that the sign
be removed. The court stated that the traditional view should
not be followed where falsehood causes substantial damage to
business or property. It is not clear from the opinion whether the
court would be ready to grant similar relief if a case arose involving personal disparagement without the business aspects.
Other cases, some of which relied on the presence of elements
27
of other torts such as conspiracy, intimidation and coercion
have granted injunctions to protect business interests. Thus,
injunctive relief has been granted to prevent dissatisfied customers
from decorating their cars with lemons and advertising where
25 See notes 9 and 15 supra, and accompanying text.

224 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ore. 1963), appeal dismissed, 336 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.
1943E.g., Wolf v. Cold, 9 App. Div. 2d 257, 193 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1959). But cf.
Scbmoldt v. Oakley, 390 P.2d 882 (Okda. 1964). See also 19 ORLA. L. 11Ev. 97
(1966); Note, 8 S. Tsm. L.J. 50 (1965). It is difficult to understand how admixture with elements of another tort can prevent an injunction prohibiting speech
from being a prior restraint.
26
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they had purchased them, 28 to protect the owners of apartment

houses from picketing by obstreperous tenants,29 to protect
the owner of a hospital from disparagement of that institution,"
and to protect the business interests of booksellers,3 motel
builders, 2 music publishers,33 and the operators of a professional
baseball club.34 Arguably, the results of these cases can be
reconciled with a public interest approach, such as that advocated
later in this article. In fact, it has been recognized in several trade
libel cases that the existence of a public interest factor will alone
prevent the granting of an injunction.35 But most of the courts
do not discuss the presence of public interest, but instead merely
look to see if the injunction is sought to protect business rather
than personal interests, in which case it will be granted, at least
if elements of intimidation, coercion or unfair competition can be
found.
This is where the anomaly occurs. An injunction to protect
business interests is no more or less a prior restraint on speech
than an injunction to protect interests of personality.36 The
readiness to grant injunctions in trade libel cases, while denying
them in cases concerned solely with injuries to personality, would
seem to be a triumph of materialism over humanity.
2. Privacy Cases
There are relatively few privacy cases involving problems of
injunctive relief, probably because the invasion of privacy usually
28

Carter v. Knapp Motor Co. 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943); Menard
v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937); Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino,
166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1938).
29 Springfield, Bayside Corp. v. Hochman, 44 Misc. 2d 882, 255 N.Y.S.2d 140
(194Wol v. Gold, 9 App. Div. 2d 36, 193 N.Y.S.2d
36 (1959).
3
1 American Mercury v. Chase, 13 F.2d 224 (D. Mass. 1926).
32 West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor; 23 Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196
(1960).
33

Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401
(1946).
34
Pennington v. Birmingham Baseball Club, 170 So. 2d 410 (Ala. 1964)
(mass35 picketing). Cf. NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965).
Krebiozen Research Foundation v. Beacon Press, Inc. 334 Mass. 86, 134
N.E.2d 1 (1956). The opinion in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp.
978 (D. Ore. 1963), also discusses the public interest factor, pointing out that the
injunction therein is being granted in a purel private dispute; but the opinion fails
to make clear whether the court would make public interest the key factor if a
case involved only personal rights. For a discussion of the public interest approach
occurring
in some trade libel cases see Sedler, supra note 17 at 157.
36
This point is vividly demonstrated in Sedler, supra note 17 at 154-55.
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occurs without advance notice of it to the plaintiff. In the
cases that are reported, however, as in the trade libel cases,
the courts do not seem to have much problem in granting injunctions which constitute prior restraints on speech or other forms
of expression, especially where commercial interests are at stake.
One of the earliest cases is Edison v. Edison Polyform and
Manufacturing Company,3 7 where the famous inventor, Thomas
Edison, was granted an injunction against a patent medicine
manufacturer's using the inventor's picture and name to promote
his product. The court's opinion implies that it is protecting a

personal as well as a property right.
In Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital,38 a purely personal right
was protected when the parents of a deformed child, who had
been treated in the hospital and died there, were able to produce
an injunction against the unauthorized publication of the child's
corpse by the hospital, the hospital's photographer, and a newspaper.
There are numerous cases granting injunctions enforcing the
right to enjoin the commercial exploitation of one's name without
his consent. Two of the most recent are Spahn v. Julian Messner,
Incorporated,9 in which a baseball pitcher procured an injunction
against the unauthorized publication of a fictionalized biography,
and Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Incoroprated,40 in which
several professional golfers obtained an injunction prohibiting
the manufacturer of a board game from using their pictures and
synopses of their careers without their consent in order to promote
the sale of the game.
The very recent case of Commonwealth v. Wiseman4 ' may
prove to be of great significance in the privacy area. There, the state
sought injunctive relief to prevent the public showing of a documentary film depicting conditions at a state institution for the
criminally insane. The film showed many of the inmates in
3773 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907).
38171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
39 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840 (1967). See note 90 and accompanying
text infra.
4096 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967) (reviewing many authorities).
But see Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501
(1968).
41.Mass. -, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 2165 (1970)
(three justices dissenting).
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degrading situations, sometimes in the nude. The court found
that the maker of the film had violated his contract with the state,
which brought the action as parens patriae for the inmates, in
showing the film publicly. Stating that it was protecting the right
of privacy of the inmates, the court enjoined public showing of
the film, while permitting it to be shown to limited professional
audiences. 2 The fact that the court did not feel it necessary to
discuss prior restraint illustrates the undoubted greater liberality
of the courts in protecting privacy by injunction, as compared to
reputation in defamation cases.
3. Other Cases
There are other areas in which courts grant injunctions which
are undeniably prior restraints on speech, either glossing over
that problem or ignoring it entirely. Injunctions have prohibited
a woman from falsely claiming that the plaintiff was the father of
her child,43 restrained a mother from using her husband's surname
as her children's instead of that of their true father,44 and asserted
the power to prevent a woman from holding herself out as the
wife of plaintiff's husband.4
Courts have restrained the publication of private corresponto exist,
dence, 46 and, where a common law copyright47 is found
48
even an expression imbued with the public interest.
C. The Misapplicationof the Prior Restraint Doctrine
to Private Litigationin the Defamation-PrivacyArea.
The existence of so many cases which are prime candidates
for the application of the prior restraint doctrine, but in which
it is seldom or never mentioned, indicates that the doctrine may
42 The court did discuss extensively the factor of public interest. See note 103
and accompanying text infra, for an extensive discussion of the case from this
aspect.
43
Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957); Vanderbilt v.
Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907).
44 Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 5, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956).
45 Niver v. Niver, 200 Misc. 993, 111 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1951).
46 See, e.g., Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1902); King v. King,
25 Wyo. 275, 168 P. 730 (1912).
47 "Common law copyright" is that right which an author has in his unpublished literary creations, a kind of property whose extent is to give him control over
first publication of his work or to prevent its publication. Hemingway's Estate v.
Random
48 House, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 462, 465, 279 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (1966).
See, e.g., King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 273 A.C.A. 807 (1969) (professor's class
notes).
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be inappropriate for private litigation in the defamation-privacy
area as well.
Indeed, a close examination of the cases and secondary
authorities dealing with prior restraint leads to the conclusion
that its validity as a constitutional bar to the granting of equitable
relief against speech in an appropriate case has been greatly
exaggerated. Such an analysis reveals that an essential characteristic of an objectionable prior restraint is that it be part of a
system of governmental censorship, whereby all future publications of a certain type are prohibited or required to obtain prior
approval of some censorial authority. These factors do not exist in
a private citizen's actions to enjoin defamation or invasion of
privacy.
In the leading prior restraint case, Near v. Minnesota,4 9 a state
statute provided for the "abatement as a nuisance" in an action
brought by the public prosecutor of any obscene or "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory" publication. Under this statute, the
state courts had enjoined further publications of a scandalous
or defamatory nature by the defendant newspaper, which had
printed virulent attacks on public officials, including the prosecutor who brought the action, accusing them of gross neglect of
duty and complicity with gangsters. The Court struck down the
statute, but the reasons it gave in so doing would not prevent
granting injunctive relief pursuant to the thesis advanced herein.
First, it is to be noted that the immediate occasion of the
injunction in Near was attacks on public officials, which the
criteria suggested herein would still exempt from suppression
by injunction under any circumstances. Secondly, truth was not a
defense under the statute in Near, as it is under the position
adduced herein. Third, the Near injunction had the effect of
enjoining future publication of the newspaper because of what
had been said in past publications, and the standards as to what
was prohibited were quite vague. The following excerpt from
the opinion makes it clear that this was the factor uppermost
in the Court's mind:
The statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical, but to put the publisher under an effective
49 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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censorship. When a newspaper or periodical is found to be
'[m]alicious, scandalous and defamatory,' and is suppressed
as such, resumption of publication is punishable as a contempt
. . . Thus, where a newspaper or periodical has been suppressed because of the circulation of charges against public officers official misconduct, it would seem to be clear
that the renewal of the publication of said charges would
constitute a contempt, and that the judgment would lay a
permanent restraint upon the publisher, to escape which he
must satisfy the court as to the character of the new publication.
[If such a publication is made following the injunction]
unless the owner or publisher is able and disposed to bring
competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the charges are
true and are published with good motives and for justifiable
ends, his newspaper or periodical is suppressed and further
publication is made punishable as a contempt. This is the
essence of censorship. 0
In contrast, private injunctive actions against defamation or
invasion of privacy are concerned with specific statements and
publications and do not involve a censorship system.
Most of the other Supreme Court cases dealing with prior
restraint have been obscenity cases, but they provide a persuasive
analogy to our subject. In Kingsley Books, Incorporated v.
Brown,5 ' the Court upheld a state statute permitting injunctions
against the sale and distribution of obscene material, but only
after a prompt and full judicial hearing on the merits. The doctrine of Near was held not to invalidate the statute, because,
"[un]like Near [the Kingsley statute] . . . studiously withholds

restraint upon matters not already published 52 and not yet found
to be offensive."5
In Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago,5" the Court
held, in sustaining an ordinance requiring the submission of a
5o Id. at 712-13.
51354 U.S. 436 (1957).
52 The Kingsley opinion makes it clear that "published" as used here does not
mean that the material has reached the public. See 354 U.S. at 442.
53 354 U.S. at 445.
54 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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motion picture to a licensing Board, that there was no constitutional right to show the picture "at least once."
In Bantam Books v. Sullivan55 and Freedman v. Maryland,5 6
the Court invalidated various procedures attempting to suppress
obscenity on the ground that there was no way for the publisher
to secure prompt judicial review and that the burden of establishing the innocence of the publication was on the publisher;
but both cases approved the doctrine of Kingsley, that there can
be a valid prior restraint where there is recourse to prompt judicial
review, with the burden on the person seeking the injunction.
A leading authority has stated that the following are the
characteristics of an objectionable prior restraint:
1. It is a system designed to subject "to governmental
scrutiny and approval all expression in the area controlled
-the innocent and borderline as well as the offensive, the
routine as well as the unusual. The machinery is gearedto
universalinspection,not to scrutiny in particularcases..."
(Emphasis added)
2. An undue amount of delay is involved.
3. The burden of initial action falls on the publisher, not on
the one desiring the suppression of the matter under consideration.
4. There is a lack of the safeguards which would prevail in
criminal proceedings brought after the publication, especially the right of trial by jury.
5. The initial decision rests in an administrative official rather
than the courts.
6. The actions of the licensing authority are screened from
public scrutiny and are apt to become arbitrary.
7. Most significantly, the very nature of a system of censorship contains "forces which drive irresistibly toward unintelligent, overzealous, and usually absurd administration."57
In contrast, it is to be noted that actions by private individuals for protection of their reputations and privacy, under the
criteria we have suggested above, are directed to a specific statement or narrowly circumscribed subject matter and not to
55372 U.S. 58 (1963).

56 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
57
Emerson, supra note 20 at 655-60.
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"universal inspection." The burden is on the plaintiff both to
initiate proceedings and to prove falsity, where truth is in issue,
and this by clear and convincing evidence. All proceedings are
judicial and of an adversary nature and, under a modem procedural system, a prompt hearing can be afforded. None of the
forces are present which might lead to "absurd administration."
The only factors listed as objectionable above which might
inhere in our suggested approach are a lack of safeguards inherent
in a criminal proceeding and trial by jury. Trial by jury and other
criminal safeguards were not required in Kingsley Books, but the
court can substantially provide them by using a strict standard
of proof and advisory jury, if it deems it necessary. 58
The suggested approach conforms to the criteria for what
has recently been called "First Amendment Due Process," namely,
that a judicial body, following an adversary hearing, must decide
on the protected character of the speech, and that the judicial
determination must either proceed or immediately follow any
governmental action which restricts speech.59 Under close analysis, then, it appears that the so-called doctrine of prior restraint
has been a needless bugaboo in preventing the granting of
equitable relief to protect reputation and privacy in meritorious
cases.
Having examined the traditional view that equitable relief
is unavailable in the defamation-privacy area, and having shown
the foundation on which this traditional view rests-the prior
restraint doctrine-is unstable in the extreme, we are ready to
proceed with the main purpose of this article, a re-evaluation of
the entire area.
IV. NEw YoRu Tnms Co. v. SULLiVAN: ITS TEACHING WrrH
REGARD TO INJUNCTIONS AGAINST SPEECH AND WrrTING

A. Originand Development of the New York Times Doctrine
Inasmuch as the origin and development of the doctrine of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"0 has been extensively treated
58 It has been suggested that under modem conditions, the first amendment
requires contraction rather than expansion of the jury's function. See note 19
supra.
59 See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARv. L. REv. 518
(1970).
60376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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elsewhere, 0 1 we will discuss it here only insofar as it is necessary
to an understanding of its application to the problem of injunctions against speech.
New York Times was a libel action by the Police Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, which arose out of the publication of an advertisement in the Times by a group of civil rights
activists. While there was some doubt that the advertisement
could be read as referring to the Commissioner, there was no
doubt that some of its factual assertions were inaccurate and that
the newspaper had in its own news files, which it did not check,
facts which revealed the advertisement's errors. Applying Alabama's traditional libel laws, which like those of most states
practically imposed strict liability for erroneous defamatory
statement, a state court jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in
the amount of $500,000.
When the case eventually reached the Supreme Court of the
United States, the judgment was reversed with directions that
the case be remanded and dismissed. Relying on the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court stated a holding, concise
but fraught with far-reaching significance:
The Constitutional guaranties require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"
-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
62
disregard of whether it was false or not.
Thus, a qualified privilege was substituted for the virtual strict
liability that had existed before that time under state law.63 The
holding was based upon the Court's belief that free speech would
61 See Bertelsman, The First Amendment and Protection of Reputation and
Privacy-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and How It Grew, 56 Ky. L.J. 718
(1968); Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment; Hill, Butts and
Walker 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267; Kalven, The New York Case: A Note on "the
Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964 Sup. Or. REV. 191; Note, Free
Speech and Defamation of Public Persons, The Expanding Doctrine of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 419 (1967); Note, Privacy, Defamation
and the First Amendment: The Implications of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUm. L.
REv. 926 (1967).
62376
U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
6
3 Under the law of most states prior to New York Times there was a qualified
privilege for matters concerning the public interest, but it was much weaker than
the constitutional privilege afforded by New York Times. See Berteisman, supra

note 61 at 723-24; W. PnossER, ToRTs 819-23 (3d ed. 1964).
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be inhibited if strict responsibility for factual misstatement were
to be enforced.
[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man
may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade
others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at
times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification... and even to
false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained
in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view,
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part
of the citizens of a democracy.
. . . erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and
must be protected, if the freedoms of expression are to have
the 'breathing space" they need to survive.64
Immediately after the Supreme Court's decision in New York
Times, pressure to expand the doctrine beyond elected public
officials arose, as defendant after defendant attempted to claim
protection of the doctrine in defamation cases.65 It was very early
applied to candidates for public office,66 and subsequently to
minor public employees such as policemen, 67 political party
64 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964).
65 See Bertelsman, supra note 61 at 724-36; Annot. 19 A.L.R.3d 1361 (1968).
66See Dyer v. Davis, 250 La. 533, 189 So. 2d 678 (1966); McFadden v.
Detroit Bar Assn, 4 Mich. App. 554, 145 N.W.2d 285 (1966); Gilberg v. Goa,
21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964) (candidate's law partner).
67 See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d
558 (7th Ols. 1965); Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1965).
See also Thompson v. St. Anant, 250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d 255 (1967), rev'd on
other grounds, 390 U.S. 727 (1969) (deputy sheriff); Duffy v. Kipers, 26 App.
Div. 2d 127, 271 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1966) (deputy town cerk). Silbowitz v. Lepper
55 Misc. 2d 443, 285 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1967) (supervisor of branch post office);
McNabb v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 55 Tenn. App. 380, 400 S.W.2d 871
(1965) (election official).
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executives, 8 and the manager of a publicly owned ski resort.6 9
Finally, it was applied to public figures such as a controversial
ex-general, 70 a prominent physicist who liked to engage in public controversies, 71 a football coach accused of fixing a game,7"
and other sports figures 73 In the most extreme extension that has
come before the Supreme Court, the Times doctrine was even

extended to a private individual who had been involuntarily drawn
into the public eye by reason of being held captive by escaped
convicts. 74 A lower court recently applied it to a man who was
sued for striking his golfing partner with a poorly-directed golf
75

ball.
Although the growth of the Times doctrine provides a fascinating study of development of legal dogma, we are not here
primarily interested in that aspect of the case. Rather, we are

concerned with the First Amendment principles that can be
derived from the theory and their application to suits for injunctive
relief against expression.

B. Applicability to Injunctive Relief
A cursory reading of New York Times and subsequent cases

applying its doctrine might lead one to believe that the Court
had entirely rejected the proposition that falsity was outside the
scope of First Amendment protection. 76 But further analysis and

a reading of the later cases shows that the rejection of that
68

News Journal Co. v. Gallagher, - Del. -, 233 A.2d 166 (1967).
In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), the court remanded a case tried
prior to New York Times for a determination as to whether such an individual was
a "public official."
70 Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
71
See Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1966); Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964) (dicta);
975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1966).
Pauling
7 2 v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (companion case
Press v. Walker 388 U.S. 130 (1967)).
to Associated
7
3 Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 436 P.2d 756 (Wash. 1967) (basketball
coach). Spahm v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840 (1967).
For a74discussion of the Spalin litigation, see note 91 infra, and accompanying text.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
75
76 Sellers v. Time Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
Until New York Times, defamation had been considered a type of expression
not protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952). This concept was accepted even by advocates of the "absolutist"
interretation of the Amendment. See, e.g., Meildejohn, The Fir# Armendmrn
qr. ,Aboute, 1961 Su'. Cr. REV, 245,
69
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view was only a partial one. For the basis of the Times doctrine was not that falsehood merits constitutional protection,
but the realization that there must be some protection of falsehood
if the publication of truth is to be unhampered to the extent that
the First Amendment requires. As the Court itself put it:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee
the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of
libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to ...
'self-censorship.' . . . Under such a rule would-be critics of
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism,
even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in
fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court
or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make
only statements which steer far wider of the unlawful zone.
...
The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety
of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Emphasis added.)77
This approach was more recently reaffirmed, when the Court
said:
But New York Times and succeeding cases have emphasized that the stake of the people in public business and the
conduct of public officials is so great that neither the defense
of truth nor the standard of ordinary care would protect
against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First
Amendment policies. Neither lies nor false communications
serve the ends of the First Amendment, and no one suggests
their desirability or further proliferation. But to insure the
ascertainment and publication of the truth about public
affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some
erroneous publications as well as true ones. (Emphasis
added. )7s
Thus, under New York Times, there is no absolute privilege for
false speech. Even a candidate for the Presidency of the United
States may recover damages for a false attack on himself in that
capacity where the attack was made with reckless disregard of
the truth.7 9 The crucial issue with respect to the subject of this
77 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
78 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968).
79 Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 90 S. Ct. 701
(1970).
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article, which these considerations yield is simply this: If false
speech may be punished after publication by "libel judgments
virtually unlimited in amount", may it not be constitutionally
enjoined if falsity is proved by clear and convincing evidence
prior to publication?
C. Cases Involving a Legitimate Public Concern
It is submitted that there is no valid reason why such an injunction should not be issued, where the proper procedural safeguards
of a plenary and immediate judicial hearing are observed. We
hasten to add, however, that it is not advocated that such injunctions against expression should issue without limitation, even
where the matter sought to be enjoined is false. It is believed that
matters directly concerning politics and government are too sensitive for injunctions to be permitted in a democratic society. There
are also other matters in which the public has a legitimate concern
in hearing whatever anyone has to say on the subject where
injunctions should not be permitted.
At first glance, this might appear to be inconsistent with the
remarks made above asserting that the doctrine of prior restraint
had been exaggerated as a bar to injunctions against expression,
but there is a genuine distinction. As was pointed out above,
under the prior restraint doctrine as traditionally applied, an
injunction would automatically be denied even if it involved an
accusation by a crank that a purely private individual was a sexual
pervert, a thief, or a deadbeat-something in which the public had
no legitimate concern whatever. Actually, however, the doctrine of
prior restraint should not be applied to that kind of case, but
only in areas involving systems of governmental censorship.
The assertion that some areas of expression should be insulated
from the application of injunctive relief is not an application of
the doctrine of prior restraint. The situations in mind are those
similar to the recent Goldwater0 decision, where attacks were
made in a magazine article concerning the mental stability of a
United States Senator who was also a candidate for President of
the United States. The attacks were scurrilous, shocking and
without foundation, and Senator Goldwater ultimately recovered
80 Id,
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substantial damages, proving in the process that there had been
"calculated falsehood" under the stringent tests of New York
Times.
The point we are trying to make here is sharply delineated by
posing the question: What if Senator Goldwater had found out
in advance about the publication of the articles and sought an
injunction against their publication? Such an injunction should
not be granted-not because of a sterile, mechanistic application
of the doctrine of prior restraint-but because to enjoin an attack
on a public official or candidate for public office, even if it is false,
smacks too much of seditious libel and the Star Chamber to be
tolerated in a democratic society. As professor Kalven has said
about seditious libel, i.e., libel against government:
The concept of seditious libel strikes at the very heart of
democracy. Political freedom ends when government can
Deuse its powers and its courts to silence its critics ....
famation of the government is an impossible notion for a
democracy. In brief, I suggest, that the presence or absence
in the law of the concept of seditious libel defines the society.
A society may or may not treat obscenity or contempt by publication as legal offenses without altering its basic nature.
If, however, it makes seditious libel an offense, it is not a free
society no matter what its other characteristics. 8 '

The New York Times doctrine's permitting the recovery of
damages to an officeholder or candidate only after the publication, on proof of calculated falsehood, steers sufficiently clear of
the reef of seditious libel. But for the courts to enjoin campaign
oratory and similar expression in advance, could raise the specter
of the police state.82

Somewhat the same considerations make it unwise to grant
injunctive relief in areas of legitimate public concern outside of
government itself. For example, matters involving public health
81 Kalven, The York Times Case: A Note on "The CentralMeaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. Or. REv. 191, 205. In New York Times it was recognized
that a libel so general as to constitute a libel of government (as opposed to a libel
of some governmental officer) was absolutely privileged, 376 U.S. 254, 288-92
(1964). Accord, Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81-3 (1966).
82So strong is the policy against enjoining comment on public officials and
governmental affairs that it would seem to apply even when the derogatory material
has been filched from private ifies, See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d
489 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
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such as the critical appraisal of a cancer remedy,8 or the alleged
unhealthful aspects of cigarette smoking, should not be enjoined,
regardless of whether they are in fact sound, because the public
has a legitimate concern in hearing whatever anyone has to say
on the subject. As a practical matter, however, it is probable
that few such cases could meet the stringent requisite for an
injunction against expression by the approach advocated herein.
It would be particularly difficult to prove falsity by clear and
convincing evidence, since expert testimony on all sides of any
technical question is generally easy to procure, if one can afford
to pay for it.
V.

FPRACICAL APPLICATIONS

A. Some General Considerations
In applying New York Times in this area it is important here
to distinguish certain factors present in actions for damages
which are not present in the type of injunctive action under
discussion here. In an action for damages under the New York
Times doctrine, the plaintiff, whether public official or public
figure, may recover only if he proves: 1) that the matter was
false; and 2) that it was published with knowledge of its falsity
or reckless disregard of the truth. The reason for this, as pointed
out above, is not that false speech is worthy of protection, but
that good faith factual error must be protected if there is not to
be an indirect restraint of truth. 4
In an action for an injunction, the latter consideration does
not arise. Of necessity, the injunctive action is brought before
the publication sought to be restrained. Therefore, unlike an
action for damages after the publication, only the falsity of the
subject matter should be at issue, not the state of mind of the
defendant. The defendant's state of mind is relevant in actions
for damages, so that a prospective publisher of possibly derogatory material need feel no qualms about publishing it unless he
knows it to be false or has substantial doubt of its truth. If the
plaintiff proves the falsity of the matter to the extent required
83
Krebiozen Research Foundation v. Beacon Press, Inc., 334 Mass. 86, 134
N.E.2d 1 (1956).
84 See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.
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above and the court holds it to be false, the state of mind of the
defendant should cease to be relevant in an action for injunction.
B. Cases Appropriate for Injunctive Relief
We have just discussed the political and legitimate public
interest cases, where, even under our proposed approach to the
defamation-privacy area, it is not felt that injunctive relief would
be appropriate. But there are many cases where, under the
approach advocated here, there should be no hesitancy in granting
injunctive relief where the proper procedural safeguards are met.
It was pointed out above that courts have been granting such
relief all along in cases such as those involving trade libel, commercial exploitation and common law copyright, although the
results could not be logically squared with the application of
the prior restraint doctrine in defamation or privacy cases. By
and large, the results of these cases and libel-privacy cases could
be harmonized by the adoption of the public interest approach
suggested by this article.
While the public might have a legitimate interest in some of
the aspects of the life of Thomas Edison, it hardly seems essential
to the public weal that his face peer at the populace from a
bottle of patent medicine. The voyage of the ship of state is also
unlikely to be impeded if the public is denied knowledge of false
accusations of the sexual adventures of a private person, of the
dishonesty or inefficiency of a single attorney or tradesman, or,turning to the area of privacy-of the true grim details of the
deformity of someone's child,"' or that a person is not current
in the payment of his bills, 0 or was a disreputable character in
the distant past.8 7
85 See Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
86 See Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927)

action).

aci87 See Melvin v. Reid,
pstitute, damages action).
hethe vounril
limelght,
crime, have lost their right of

(damages

112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (reformed
Of course, persons who have come into the public
Or involuntarily, such as by being the victim of a
privacy, at least for a time, even in damages actions.

Therefore, such persons would not be entitled to an injunction restraining factual
accounts of their experiences, even under the approach advocated here. See W.
PnossEr, TORTS 112 (3d ed. 1964); Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d
344 (1956); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, & Health, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68

N.Y.S.2d 779 (1947), aff d, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947) (orchestra leader). However, a fictionalized account which places the protagonist in a
false light in the public eye is more analogous to libel and is not permitted.
(Continued on next page)
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C. Borderline Cases
1. The Celebrity"'
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,8 9 the athletic director and
ex-football coach of a leading university was falsely accused in an
article by a major magazine of having plotted with the coach of
an opposing team to throw a crucial game. It was later held, in
sustaining an award of substantial damages to the ex-coach, that
there had been no sufficient basis for the article and that the
libelous statements contained in it had been made with actual
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of the
truth. Should the coach have been able to procure an injunction
against the publication of the article had he timely applied for
one?
At the conclusion of a protracted history of litigation, the
prominent baseball pitcher, Warren Spalan, was awarded an injunction against the publication of an unauthorized biography containing many inaccuracies concerning personal details of his life
such as his military experience and his courtship of his wife.90
The Supreme Court of the United States at an earlier stage of the
litigation had found Spahn was a public figure and subject to the
New York Times91 doctrine, but on remand the Court of Appeals
of New York found the inaccuracies in the biography to have
been knowingly false or made with reckless disregard of the
truth and reinstated the injunction along with an award of
damages. On the defendant's seeking further review, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari,9" directing that special attention be
given in the briefs to the injunction issue. However, the case
was settled before a decision could be had. Thus, the interesting
question remains: was the granting of an injunction correct?
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, & Heath, Inc., supra; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374 (1967); Spabn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543
(1966),
8 8 aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840 (1967).
For a discussion of the celebrity 's right to privacy written prior to New
York Times, see Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's
Right to Privacy, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 280, 288 (1957).
89
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
9
o Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840 (1967).
91 See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc, 387 U.S. 239 (1967) (per curiam) remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Time, Inc. v. Hil, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). See note 87 supra.
92 393 U.S. 818 (1968).
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The considerations are not as clear in such cases as in cases
involving campaign rhetoric or discussions of matters of clear
public concern, for these cases involve persons who are neither
entirely public nor entirely private, but whom the Supreme
Court has denominated "public figures" and held to be subject
to all the rigors of New York Times in damages actions. In applying the approach proposed in this article, the problem then arises:
are matters concerning such persons the subject of such legitimate
public concern as to be immune from injunctive actions?
The question is a close one. Matters concerning these individuals are certainly not as imbued with the public interest as
are discussions of governmental policies, the fitness of political
candidates, or the efficacy of cancer remedies, but there can be
no doubt that the public likes to read about them. The question
is closely related to one also much discussed by legal commentators
in recent years concerning the future of the right of privacy,
especially that of celebrities, in93the face of the dramatic expansions of communications media.
In damage actions which arise after the fact of publication,
the public sphere must be defined broadly, so that all will feel
free to comment in good faith on matters within the legitimate
public concern, including matters of sports and entertainment,
without pecuniary punishment. 4 But in injunction actions, where
under the approach proposed here, the falsity of the matter
sought to be restrained must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence before any injunction will issue, and the plaintiff must
show irreparable injury in a strict sense, there seems to be less
compelling public need for the sacrifice of private reputation.
While it is necessary for everyone to be free to speak out on
governmental and state affairs without restriction, simply because,
as a democratic society, we have put seditious libel and the Star
93
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964); Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the
Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutionalas Well?
46 TExAs L. Rlv. 611 (1968); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEmv. PROB. 326 (1966); Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960); Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The
Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 S. CAL.. L. REv. 280 (1957); Note, Right to Privacy:
Social Interest and Legal Right, 51 MwNN. L. REv. 531 (1967).
94
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and

Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. RE v. 267, 284.
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Chamber behind us, and while there is a need for everyone to be
free to speak out on matters of science lest somehow truth be
curbed and progress retarded in his vital area, there is no similar
need concerning the private lives of movie stars, professional
athletes and similar public figures. Therefore, where the irreparable injury is clear and the proof of falsity convincing, it would
seem that, in cases like these, the social interest in protecting
reputation and character, and thus human dignity, outweighs the
need for freedom to speak what is false.
That is not to say, however, that questions of legitimate public
concern, sufficient to cause denial of an injunction, may not exist
in cases involving celebrities. Butts is a good example. There,
not only Butts' individual reputation was at stake, but the accusations made against him impugned the integrity of college football, thus raising an issue of legitimate public concern. Injunctive
relief should be denied in such a situation.
But, the New York court seems to have been on sound ground
in granting the Spahn injunction, since no such public issue was
involved, although as the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized in granting certiorari, 95 a fuller discussion of the
considerations relating to injunctive relief would have been
appropriate.
2. Certain Trade Libel Cases
As we have tried to point out, the granting or denial of
injunctive relief in trade libel cases ought not to turn primarily
on considerations of whether damage to property as opposed to
personality is involved, or whether elements of other torts, such
as intimidation and coercion can be found. Of course, as in all
applications of our suggested approach, clear proof of irreparable
injury and falsehood is required, but the presence or absence of a
legitimate public interest in the matter under discussion should
be the critical issue.
The leading case of Krebiozen ResearchFoundationv. Beacon
Press, Incorporated,6 where an injunction was denied to the
manufacturer of a supposed cancer remedy on the ground of the
presence of the legitimate concern of the public in hearing what
95

Spaln v. Julian Messner, Inc., 393 U.S. 818 (1968).

96334 Mass. 86, 134 N.E.2d 1 (1956).
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anyone had to say on the merits of such an important issue, is a
7
clear illustration.
But trade libel cases can present much closer questions. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company" is a good example. The court
found that the farmer's accusations of air pollution were concerned with such a minor geographical area that no legitimate
public concern arose. But if the controversy involved a whole
city, or even an entire neighborhood it is easy to see that a much
more difficult case might arise, especially in these days where
air pollution is such a critical problem.
Even the case of a defamed attorney or doctor might cause
problems, if the accusations related, not to the handling of a
single matter, but say to the general inefficiency of an entire
profession or industry,99 or a company serving a large segment of
the public. 00
There have been a few cases where organizations, which some
might consider rather stuffy about the whole matter, have
attempted to classify what is really broad social satire as trade
libel for the purpose of seeking injunctive relief, which the courts
have rightly refused. In one amusing case (amusing to the
reader, if not to the plaintiff), the Girl Scouts of America were
denied an injunction against a pop art publishing company's
distribution of a poster depicting an obviously pregnant young
lady clad in Girl Scout regalia, captioned with the Girl Scout
motto, "BE PREPARED". 10 1 In another, a prominent university,
famous for its outstanding football teams, was similarly denied
an injunction against a motion picture using its name as a vehicle
1 2
to spoof big time college football.
As the courts correctly pointed out, the expression involved was
really satirical social commentary, and not intended to be taken
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A much earlier case employing similar reasoning, together with more technical grounds in refusing to enjoin criticism of a patent medicine is Willis v.
O'Connell, 231 F. 1004 (S.D. Ala. 1916).
98224 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ore. 1963), appeal dismissed, 336 F.2d 876 (9th
Cir. 1964) discussed at text accompanying note 26, supra.
99 See Schutzman & Schutzman v. News Syndicate Co., 60 Misc. 2d 827, 304
N.Y.S.2d 167 (1969).
-00 See Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
101 Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F.
Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
102University of Notre Dame v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 22 App.
Div. 2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1965), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508
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as seriously referring to the prestigious institutional plaintiffs.
Even had it been satire seriously directed at the plaintiffs, it
remains a legitimate mode of expression, and when directed at
objects of legisimate public concern should not be enjoined.
3. The case of Commonwealth v. Wisema&1 °3
This case presents an almost unique situation, and is one of
particular difficulty in applying the public interest approach suggested herein. The action was one brought by the state of
Massachusetts, as parens patriaeon behalf of certain inmates of a
state institution for the criminally insane, to enjoin the showing
of a documentary film portraying the operation of the institution.
The film had been made under a contract with the institution
designed to protect the inmates' right of privacy.
The film, as finally produced, showed many identifiable
inmates in degrading circumstances, e.g., in the nude and even
in the performance of unnatural sexual acts. The contract required the producer to obtain releases from any inmates shown,
but since most of them were legally incompetent, the releases
were probably invalid. The film was also critical of the administration of the institution, particularly with regard to what it regarded
as unnecessary callousness toward the inmates.
Prior to the beginning of the Massachusetts litigation, certain
guards at the institution had sought a preliminary injunction in
a federal district court in New York on the ground that it violated
the guards' right of privacy.1 04 The federal court considered the
case analogous to Time, Inc. v. Hill, and denied the injunction
on the ground that the plaintiff guards failed to show that the
film if inaccurate at all, was "a deliberately or recklessly false
account of conditions at [the institution concerned.]" 0 5
The highest court of Massachusetts in the litigation brought
for the inmates reached a contrary result, enjoining the film from
being shown to the general public, but permitting it to be shown
to selected groups of physicians, social workers, and other pro103.Mass. -,
249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 2165
(1970). See Note, 83 IAnv. L. REv. 1722 (1970); Conmnent, The "Titicut
Follies" Case: Limiting the Public Interest Privilege, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 359
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Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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fessionals. In commenting on the ruling in the federal litigation,
the Massachusetts court pointed out that the plaintiffs in that
action were guards, not the inmates who had been shown in the
degrading circumstances depicted in the film, and that, in any
event, it declined "to follow the broad interpretation given in the
Cullen case to Time, Inc., v. Hill."0 6
The producer of the film sought certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the United States which was denied, with Justices
Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan dissenting.17 Justice Harlan
filed a lengthy dissenting opinion in which he said: "I fail to
see how, on a complex and important issue like this, it can be
concluded that this Court should withhold plenary review."I'°
The Justice's conclusion certainly appears sound, especially in
light of the fact that the Court had, a year earlier, granted
certiorari in Spahn with special directions to focus the briefs on
the injunction problems raised. Spahn's commercial setting would
make it seem a much less compelling case for Supreme Court
review than the issues concerning the administration of a public
institution involved in Wiseman.
Turning to the merits of Wiseman, we are confronted with a
Gordian's knot of conflicting meritorious interests. The inmates
in the film could be readily identified by those acquainted with
them, and the circumstances under which they were shown
would undoubtedly cause grave emotional distress to their
families, if not to themselves. Yet, the point of the film was to
impress upon the public the callousness that often exists in
institutions of this kind and the public indifference to it. While
undoubtedly its producer desired to reap a financial reward from
the production, yet it also seems clear that the film was designed
to counteract the public apathy to the situation, and had to be
somewhat shocking to achieve that purpose.
A comparison of the federal and the Massachusetts litigation
in the case provides an ideal vehicle to illustrate the application
of the criteria suggested by this article. Under these criteria the
New York Times "calculated falsehood" approach would not be
pertinent to an application for an injunction. The requirements
Mass. -,
249 N.E.2d 610, 618 (1969).
107 Wiseman v. Massachusetts, 90 S. Ct. 2165 (1970).
108 Id. at 2167.
106 Commonwealth v. Wiseman, -
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of adequate procedural safeguards having been met, two issues
would arise:
1. Was the matter in the film proved by the plaintiff by clear
and convincing evidence to have been false, or were the
inmates' rights of privacy violated?
2. Even if there is falsity and invasion of privacy, should
an injunction be denied because the film is of such
compelling legimate public concern that it should be
presented to the public in any event? 10 9
Regarding the second issue, under the exceptional circumstances in this case, this would not necessarily be the same
inquiry which arises in practically every case; namely, whether
the plaintiff has so come into the public limelight as to have lost
his right of privacy, because the film could have been shot in
such a manner that the inmates were not identifiable, thus preserving their personal right of privacy. It is perfectly conceivable,
under these peculiar circumstances, that the injunction could be
denied because of the public interest in the subject matter of the
film, but that individual inmates unnecessarily, or for purposes
of sensationalism shown in such circumstances as to shock the
sensibiliies, could subsequently recover damages for violation
of their individual rights of privacy.
To the writer it seems that the opinions in the federal and
state cases make clear that the plaintiffs in both cases failed to
meet the stringent burden of proof of falsity. But assuming that
the findings of the Massachusetts court that some inmates' right
of privacy had been violated is correct, it still seems that the
public issues are so compelling that the injunction should have
been denied. To allow the film to be shown to select groups of
professionals, as the Massachusetts court did, does not solve the
problem, because one of its purposes was to destroy public
apathy toward the alleged inhumanity that existed in institutions
such as the one under study.
A Note on Balancing
Some time after this article had originally been submitted for
publication, Professor Thomas I. Emerson's monumental work,
109 Any injunction must also, of course be narrowly drawn. Here, perhaps,
the film could be edited so the inmates could not be identified.
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published. Professor
Emerson does not specifically discuss injunctions in the defamation-privacy area, and his analysis of what the law is under New
York Times and its underlying theories as now actually embodied
in the Supreme Court opinions seems perfectly consistent with
that advanced in this article. But it must be frankly admitted
that his proposals concerning what the law ought to be would be
directly opposed to the approach we are proposing.
Because of the excellent manner in which Professor Emerson
develops his proposals, and the beautiful succinctness with which
he states his conclusions following an extensive development of
his line of thought, his position is susceptible of accurate summary.
He asserts that, under the first amendment and the system
of freedom of expression which his treatise undertakes to construct upon it, "one would expect to find small room remaining
for the law of libel.""10 He holds that "no area of communication
should be abridged by libel laws""- except in a very narrow
area where expression is considered by him to be equivalent to
action." 2 To him, this extremely narrow area is probably more
or less identical with the Constitutional right of privacy as
delineated in Griswold v. Connecticut,' which the reader will
recall held that the government had no right to inquire into the
use of contraceptives by married couples in their own bedroom.
In Professor Emerson's own words his thesis is summarized as
follows:
TimE SYSTEM OF FBEEDOM OF EXPRESSION was

We are now in a position to bring together the law of libel
and the law of privacy insofar as they relate the law of the
First Amendment. Communication that invades the inner
core of the personality, assaulting the dignity of the individual
by depicting matters of a wholly personal and intimate
nature, may be subject to government control. Under existing
legal doctrine, if such communication contained matter that
was false and defamatory, it would be governed by the law
of libel. If the matter was not false, it would be subject to a
privacy action. Or either kind of communication might be
regulated by some other form of governmental sanction.
13o T. EMmisoN, THE SYSTEM OF FpyrmoM OF ExPRESSION 531 (1970).
M Id. at 542.
112 Id. at 543.
113381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Outside this narrow area the First Amendment would afford
full protection. Under this approach, it would no longer be
necessary to distinguish the libel action from the privacy
action.'1 4
It would seem that the practical application of Professor
Emerson's proposal would be that one could be recoverably
damaged by, or perhaps enjoin, the publication of photographs,
films and sound recordings of himself in the shower, making
love, or perhaps engaged in attending to certain other natural
functions to the exigencies of which we are all subject, but other
than this anything goes. Ordinary private citizens would be
subject to these stringent restrictions, as well as "public men".
It is submitted that human dignity is entitled to somewhat more protection than that. Professor Emerson attacks the
approach of the Court in the New York Times doctrine on the
fact that it is a "balancing" approach, and I suppose it is. But
Professor Emerson is himself a balancer, however adamantly
he might deny it. He balances the absolute terms of the first
amendment ("Congress shall make no law abridging . . . the
freedom of the press") to the extent of protecting an "inner core
of intimacy"." 5 No doubt his basic decency impels him to depart
from the "absolutist" approach to the first amendment at least
that far. If Professor Emerson can do this, why cannot the
Supreme Court, as it has tried to do in its New York Times doctrine, balance a little further to protect what might be called "a
basic aura of human dignity." This is essentially what New York
Times does and what this article proposes in regard to injunctive
relief in the free speech area. It is true that it is no easy job to
reconcile the interest in protecting basic human dignity with
the demands of free expression. But it is submitted that it would
be well worth the effort.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLrSON
Equity has traditionally refused to grant injunctions against
defamation and invasion of privacy, even in actions brought by
private citizens under the most compelling circumstances, pri14 T. EmEwsoN, supra note 110 at 562.
"5 Id. at 557. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First

Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL.m L. REv.
935, 93548 (1968).
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marily because it was felt that such injunctions would constitute
a prior restraint prohibited by the First Amendment. In other
kinds of cases, however, particularly those involving trade libel,
injury to business or property interests, injunctions that were
just as much a prior restraint have been more or less freely
granted. This inconsistency cannot be satisfactorily explained
in terms of the prior restraint doctrine alone. The results of most
of the cases show that the employment of a public interest test,
rather than a total prohibition on prior restraint, is the appropriate
approach to this problem.
A,line of cases originating with New York Times in 1964
provides a theoretical basis for the use of a public interest test in
the defamation-privacy area in cases involving both personal and
property rights. This line of decisions strongly suggested that
false and defamatory speech was not worthy of First Amendment
protection, although in damage actions good faith factual error
must be protected so that the publication of the truth in matters
of public interest will not be inhibited.
An analysis of the authorities dealing with the doctrine of
prior restraint, especially Kingsley Books, reveals that not all prior
restraints are objectionable, only those that are directed to all
future publications by a given publisher or do not afford prompt
judicial review in an adversary proceeding, or repose too much
authority in an administrative official-in short, those that constitute part of a censorship system.
Applying these principles, then, there would seem to be no
valid constitutional objection to the granting of injunctions in
defamation and privacy cases under the following standards:
(1) the plaintiff must prove falsity and irreparable injury by
clear and convincing evidence; (2) the procedural system must
afford a prompt judicial hearing; (3) any injunction must be
narrowly drawn with great particularity with respect to the expression enjoined; and finally, (4) no injunction should issue in
any case concerning matters charged with a legitimate public
interest, such as the libel of public officials.
It is submitted that the approach suggested here would
protect freedom of speech and human dignity and personality
as well, without sacrificing one to the other. Equity would then
fulfill more truly its tradition of affording complete justice.

